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The recording and playback system (RPS) in video conference system needs to store mass of media data real-timely. Considering
the security issue, media data should be encrypted before storing. Traditional full encryption and partial encryption algorithms
are not applicable to RPS because they could not adjust their speed to meet the throughput variation of media data in real-time
RPS. In this paper, a novel lightweight speed-adaptive media-data encryption (SAME) scheme is proposed firstly. Secondly, the
SAME is improved to a packet-based algorithm according to the implementation of data storage in RPS system. Thirdly, an RPS
oriented queue theory-based autoadaptive speed control mechanism for SAME is designed. Finally, these schemes are integrated
into the practical system, that is, AdmireRPS, an RPS of a heterogeneous wireless network-(HWN-) oriented video conference
system. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show the SAME is eﬀective enough to support real-time applications. In
addition, the proposed schemes also can be used in video surveillance and other video recording systems.
1. Introduction
With the development of multimedia and network tech-
nologies, video conferences and some other streaming
media systems have attracted significant research eﬀorts
[1–8]. Recording and playback system (RPS), which stores
large-volume media data and plays them back according
to requirements of users, plays an important role in a
video conference system. Since the media data stored in
RPS contain all the crucial information of the meetings,
they should be encrypted properly. However, traditional
full-encryption algorithms are not applicable due to the
high-volume of media data and real-time requirements of
multimedia applications [1]. How to maintain the security
of media data becomes a challenge task [1, 8, 9]. To solve this
problem, a lot of multimedia (e.g., image, video, or audio)
content encryption schemes have been proposed during
the last decade. In this paper, more attention is paid on
video encryption, since bandwidth of image or audio data is
comparatively less than that of video. According to diﬀerent
viewpoints, those encryption schemes can be divided into
diﬀerent kinds, respectively. From the way they reduce the
computational complexity, these schemes could be divided
into three types, that is, partial encryption [10, 11], joint
compression encryption [1], and improved full encryption
[12].
Partial encryption encrypts a selected crucial subset of
media data. One kind of partial encryption focuses on I-
frames or intramacroblocks in video frames. The algorithm
proposed in [10] encrypts only the I-frames in MPEG2.
Although the other data are still clear, and might be
eavesdropped by attackers, it is very hard to rebuild a clear
video copy without the I-frames. However, the practical
analysis given in [13] shows that without the I-frames video
contents are still discernible, because the unencrypted I
macroblocks in the P-frames can be fully decoded. So, it is
not secure enough for some confidential applications [14].
An improved scheme called SECMpeg is proposed in [15].
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It has implemented 4 levels of security. One important
level is to encrypt all the I-blocks in P- and B-frames.
This scheme can provide higher security but suﬀers a
substantial increasing of complexity. Moreover, it needs the
encryption process to parse the P- and B-frames, and is not
suitable for RPS. Another kind of partial encryption focuses
on discrete cosine transform (DCT) coeﬃcients, motion
vector, and other sensitive data. For example, Tang [16]
encrypted videos by scrambling discrete cosine transform
(DCT) coeﬃcients. Shi and Bhargava [17] proposed a video
encryption algorithm, where the 64 most significant sign
bits of DCT coeﬃcients and motion vectors in each 16 ×
16 macroblock are encrypted by a symmetric cipher. In
some other schemes [18, 19], intraprediction mode, residue
data, and motion vector are encrypted partially to keep
format compliance. The third kind of algorithms use some
lightweight algorithms to encrypt the sensitive data, for
example, in image encryption, Lian et al. [20] used chaotic
cipher to encrypt JPEG2000 images. With regard to audio
encryption, several partial encryption schemes are also
proposed [1, 11].
Joint compression encryption is another kind of media
content encryption. Wu and Kuo [21] implemented encryp-
tion operations in entropy coding. In [22], the scheme
combined fixed length code (FLC) and variable length
code (VLC) codeword, which is achieved by permuting the
codeword and encrypting the index of code table inMPEG-4.
In [23], a perceptual video encryption scheme is proposed
based on exploiting the special feature of entropy coding in
H.264.
Improved full-encryption schemes use some lightweight
algorithms to encrypt the whole bit stream. In [1, 20, 24],
chaotic stream ciphers are constructed and used to encrypt
video data. Besides chaotic stream ciphers, VEA scheme is
another improved full-encryption scheme [12]. The main
idea of VEA is as follows. Divide the plaintext into two
segments: Even and Odd, encrypt the Odd with a standard
encryption algorithm E(Odd), and the other half Even
is exclusive-ORed (Xor) with the plaintext of Odd. This
mechanism can reduce the complexity to nearly one half and
achieve a suﬃcient security level. This algorithm is extended
to encrypt one fourth of the plaintext in [25]. These schemes
can encrypt the compressed video data, and fit the RPS.
But their encryption rate is changeless, so the encryption
throughput of them could not adjust to meet the variation
of media data throughput in real-time RPS.
On the other hand, according to the data format or
application they oriented, these encryption schemes can
be classified into two types, that is, one is all-purpose
scheme, and the other focuses on special codec standards or
applications. As mentioned above, the schemes in [10, 15]
select the I-frames or I-blocks to encrypt, and the ones
in [16–19, 26] choose the DCT coeﬃcients and sign bits
of the motion vectors to encrypt. These schemes can be
used in diﬀerent codec standards. The other kind of scheme
focuses on the special image, audio, and video standards.
For example, the schemes in [20, 27] aim at encrypting
the image of JPEG2000, the one in [11] aims at G.729
data encryption, and the ones in [18, 19] study the AVC
encryption. There are also some schemes focusing on special
applications, for example, joint fingerprint embedding and
en/decryption algorithms are proposed and used in digital
rights management (DRM) [3, 28]. The security of mul-
timedia content in IPTV is studied in [4, 5]. Chen et al.
[2] proposed a mathematical model-based dynamic optimal
selective control mechanism for optimizing the security of
multidatastreams in video conference. These schemes are
designed based on the special needs of applications.
Among the mentioned algorithms above, joint compres-
sion encryption needs to analyze the compressed data, which
is infeasible for practical RPS systems. Partial encryption and
improved full-encryption algorithms have also some limita-
tions, because they could not adjust their speed to meet the
variation of media data throughput of RPS. Therefore, in this
paper, we design a secure real-time recording and playback
system, named AdmireRPS, based on a novel Speed-Adaptive
Media-Data Encryption (SAME). As of our knowledge, this
is the first media encryption scheme considering the adaptive
media throughput. Firstly, by combining the block cipher
and stream cipher, a lightweight speed-adaptive media-data
encryption is proposed. Secondly, a packet-based SAME
(PSAME) is proposed, according to the implementation of
data storage in a practical RPS system. Thirdly, a queue
theory based autoadaptive speed control mechanism for
SAME is designed. Finally, those schemes are integrated into
AdmireRPS system. Theoretical and experimental analyses
show the performance of SAME is eﬀective enough to
support real-time applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the overview of AdmireRPS system and its security
problems. The design and implement of AdmireRPS are
given in Section 3. The speed-adaptive media-data encryp-
tion (SAME) and autoadaptive speed control mechanism for
SAME are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 discusses
the performances and presents the theoretical analysis and
experimental results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Admire and Encryption Bottleneck
2.1. An Overview of Admire System. As is shown in Figures
1 and 2, the Admire (ADvanced Multimedia Interactive
Real-time Environment) system [2, 6, 7] is a heterogeneous
wireless network-oriented large-scale multimedia collabora-
tion system. It is compatible with multicast, unicast, wired,
and wireless clients, and includes not only video conference
system but also RPS, immediate message system (IMS),
electric white board, collaborate edit, desktop sharing, and so
forth. This system has been used in hundreds of universities
and institutes. In the biggest session, there are more than 100
users joined in at one time.
2.2. Encryption Bottleneck in Admire System. To meet the
application demands of some confidential departments,
a special edition with security concern is developed, in
which data encryption is operated by a specified confi-
dential encryption algorithm which is similar to DES and
implemented in a PCI card [2]. Although the card has
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Figure 1: A practical video conference in Admire system.
a declaratory encryption throughput of 224Mbps, we find
its stable external throughput is only 12Mbps in fact [2].
We also find that the software implementation of traditional
encryption algorithm on universal processor is no more
than 200Mbps, which is inadequate to the data through-
put of MediaGateway [7], RPServer, and other servers.
Consequently, the encryption becomes a bottleneck in the
system.
The encryption speed can be accelerated according to
the growth of the CPU speed, but in the recent years
the improvement of CPU speed decelerates because of the
limit of manufacturing technology of semiconductor device,
so the perspective of the growth of encryption speed is
not optimistic. Comparatively, the disk densities improved
100 percent per year, which is faster than Moore’s Law,
something like 60 percent a year [29]. Moreover, core
network bandwidth and image process ability growing even
faster than disk densities. Predicatively, the dissymmetry
between the throughput of encryption algorithm and the
data volume to be encrypted will aggravate. Furthermore,
there is a remarkable variation of media data throughput
in Admire system, so a speed adaptive encryption scheme is
needed.
3. The Proposed AdmireRPS
3.1. AdmireRPS in Admire System. AdmireRPS is the secure
recording and playback system of Admire system. It can
encrypt and save the specified streaming media data into
media files according to the requirements of the participants.
When a user misses a meeting, RPS can playback the
audio/video for her/him, and asynchronous collaboration
could be achieved.
Figure 2 shows the architecture of AdmireRPS. On the
left of the box with broken lines are RPS clients, in the
box are the servers, including RPServer which records and
playbacks media data, ControlServer [2] which works as
the GateKeeper (GK) and ControlUnit (CU) of H.323
system, and AdmireDB which saves the session and access
control information. All these components exchange control
message using AdmireMBus [2], a lightweight message bus
which is fully encrypted.Media data are transmitted inmedia
channel, which is built based on multicast or application
layer multicast [7]. The details of the secure recording
and playback process will be presented in the following
content.
3.2. Media Data Recording and Encryption. The media data
record process in AdmireRPS is shown in Figure 2, which
includes the following 3 steps. Firstly, the client sends
the record request to ControlServer via the secure control
channel. Then, ControlServer inserts the media information,
including session information, multicast address of the
session, Synchronization SouRCe (SSRC) identifier, and so
forth, into AdmireDB. Finally, ControlServer asks RPServer
to record media data in the specified multicast address (the
client can also require RPS to record data with specified SSRC
in a multicast address).
The data in one session could be saved into a single
file or several files according to SSRC. However, we found
stable throughput of hard disk is correlate inversely with
the number of files accessed at one time, thus single-file
scheme could achieve a higher performance. On the other
hand, multifile scheme can playbackmedia data with selected
SSRCs in one session separately. This scheme can achieve
higher flexibility. Client has the right to choose either of
single or multifile in record request.
The record process in RPServer saves each received RTP
[30] packet from the specifiedmulticast address. Considering
the playback process should send those packets according
to the received time, the file structure is designed as follow
(shown in Figure 3). For each packet, there is a 96-bits
header. The first 16-bits records the total block length.
The 17th bit EF is an encryption flag, which specifies the
encryption mode and will be explained in Section 4. The
second 32-bits is time stamp, which is the time oﬀset from
the beginning packet to the current. Because the playback
module could not decode the encrypted RTP packet, the last
32-bit records the synchronize source identifier of the current
packet, which is got from the RTP header.
As is shown in Figure 4, the RTP packet is encrypted
using packet-based SAME algorithm. A speed control algo-
rithm is also introduced, which calculates the encryption
speed control parameter l according to the input packet rate.
Those two algorithms are proposed in Section 4.
3.3. The Secure Playback Process. Similar with the record
process, playback process in AdmireRPS works as follows.
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Figure 2: Architecture and control process of AdmireRPS.
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Figure 4: RTP data encryption in RPS system.
Firstly, Client sends media file inquiry request to Con-
trolServer via the encrypted control channel. Secondly,
ControlServer inquires the media file information from
AdmireDB, and sends it to Client. Thirdly, Client selects
the media file her/she wants. Fourthly, ControlServer asks
RPServer to playback the specified media file in a negotiated









Figure 5: The protocol data unit in playback system.
the media file and sends them to the negotiated multicast
address, according to the time stamp. RPServer can send the
encrypted packets or plaintext packets. When the packets
sent in ciphertext, a session key will be sent via the encrypted
control channel simultaneously.
To minimize the refactoring of the other modules in
Admire system, an AdmireNSPD (Network Service Provider
Daemon of Admire system) module [7] is designed to
substitute theWinsock, and accomplish the NAT penetrating
task. The PDU in our system is depicted in Figure 5.
RPServer packets the encrypted RTP data into the NSPD
payload, and uses one bit in NSPD header as the encryption
flag. According to this flag, client determines the decryption
way (more details are in Section 4).
4. Speed-Adaptive Media-Data
Encryption (SAME)
Statistical characteristics of compressed audio/video data
are dramatically diﬀerent from the ones of text data,
because the variable-length codes and other processes used
in compression remove the redundant information from the
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original data. Statistical analysis in [12] shows that the coded
data have high randomness at the byte level. Based on this
statistical characteristic of media data, we extend the idea of
VEA algorithm to a new method that uses traditional block
cipher to encrypt a part of data (part I), and uses its plaintext
as the stream cipher key to encrypt another part of data (part
II). By changing the ratio between parts I and II, we can
adjust the speed of the encryption algorithm.
4.1. The Basic SAME Algorithm. In the basic algorithm,
firstly, the plaintext is divided into segments with a same
length. Secondly, a selected traditional block cipher algo-
rithm is used to encrypt one segment. Thirdly, for the next
l-blocks, use the plaintext of the previous segment as its
stream cipher key. Assuming media data are saved in a FIFO
buﬀer, the basic algorithm consists of the following steps
(also shown in Figure 6).
This algorithm is designed for media file rather than
real-time packets in RPS. The improved algorithm for
packets is proposed in Section 4.2. To avoid the file header
being guessed by the attackers, the first n-segments are
full encrypted in step (2), where n is calculated from the
session key. Although the probability of a segment being
got by attackers is very little, the permutation proposed in
[12] could be used before the dividing in step (1). The
encryption speed control parameter l in step (4) is given in
Section 4.3. This important parameter can adjust the speed
of the encryption algorithm, and the experimental result
is shown in Section 5.2. For file encryption, this parameter
should be properly saved either by saving in a separate file,
or using 1 bit in the header of each segment as encryption
flag EF. The decryption process can determine the decryption
way according to EF.
Since most standard encryption algorithms need the
length of plain-block divided exactly by a very number n
(e.g., 8 bytes), the rear filling method in (1) is used in step
(6). Here, the length of filled bytes is also the value to be filled.
Figure 7 gives two examples of n = 8,
Filling Length = n− (Length mod n)
Filled Value = n− (Length mod n)
(1)
4.2. Improved Algorithm for RTP Packets. The former algo-
rithm, which is designed for byte stream, is suitable for
encrypting large-volume media file. Since both recording
and playback processes in AdmireRPS work on RTP packets,
a packet-based algorithm can achieve higher eﬃciency.
Therefore, we design a packet-based improved algorithm
shown as follows.






1, if packet is fully encrypted,
0, if Xor with the previous packet.
(2)
Because adjacent packets could have diﬀerent length, the
Xor operator in step (3) is implemented as (3), where pij is
jth byte of packet i, cij is its ciphertext, and PL
i is the length
of packet i. That is to say, if the current packet is longer than
the former one, duplicate the former packet at its rear. An
example is given in Figure 8, where PLi−1 = 1000 and PLi =
1005,
cij = pij ⊕ pi−1jmodPLi−1 . (3)
4.3. Adaptive-Speed Control Mechanism. In this subsection
a speed control mechanism is designed to determine the
encryption speed control parameter l in SAME, while the
input throughput and upper limit of the expected queuing
delay is given.
A FIFO queue is used in RPServer to buﬀer the input data
(as is shown in Figure 4). The new packets are inserted to its
rear, while the encryption process gets packets from the front.
Since the volume of media data in video conference change
dramatically, speed control mechanism should ensure that
the queuing delay is stable and under control, while take full
advantage of encryption recourse.
In order to find the relationship among the input
bandwidth, queuing delay and encryption throughput, we
make the following assumption: (1) packets arriving follows
λ-Poisson distribution, (2) encryption capacity is C, (3)
packets length Lpacket is a constraint, and (4)memory is much
greater than packet length. This is a typical model of an




1− (K + 1)ρk + Kρk+1
1− ρk+1 , (4)
where μ = C/Lpacket is the packet number algorithm can
encrypt in a unit time interval, ρ = λ/μ is the load rate, and
λ is the packets arrive rate.
If we assume that main memory capacity of RPServer
is much greater than packet length, so the parameter k is

















Therefore, given an upper limit of the expected queuing delay










We can use (6) to calculate the minimum throughput
of SAME with a limited queuing delay. For example, using
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Plaintext: stream media data
· · ·
· · ·
i + 1 seg i + 2 seg i + l seg
i + 1 cipher i + 2 cipher i + l cipher






Divide into SegLength -byte segments
KeyKey
i cipher· · ·
· · · i seg
Figure 6: Speed adaptive media-data encryption (SAME) algorithm
The basic SAME algorithm
Begin:
(1) Permute and divide the byte stream in the FIFO buﬀer into segments with a length of SegLength.
(2) Use the traditional block cipher algorithm F to encrypt the first n-segments
Do until the last segment:
(3) Use algorithm F to encrypt the first segment Segi in the buﬀer.
(4) For the next l blocks, its ciphertext CSeg j = Segj−1⊕ Seg j .
(5) Repeat the steps (3) and (4).
End Do




If (EF = full encrypt) then
PlainText = F−1(Cipheri);
Else
PlainTexti = PlainTexti−1⊕ Cipheri.
End
Algorithm 2
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 88 byte
3 3 35 byte
Figure 7: Rear padding in SAME.
encryption algorithm in PCI card, if Lpacket = 8Kb, λ =
11000, and d′queue = 4ms, we can find that C′ should be
bigger than 90Mbps. Then we look up in Figure 9 and find
l should be not less than 64 (the fifth asterisk of the blue
line in Figure 9(a)). In addition, in the practical system when
the number of queuing packets exceeds a gate valve, the
throughput of the SAME can be increased by adding the
parameter l.
5. Performance Analyses
5.1. Theoretical Security Analysis Based on Shannon Theory.
The following analysis is focused on the basic SAME
algorithm, and the result could be deduced to the improved
algorithm. Considering Segi to Segi+l, based on Shannon
theory [32], the attack diﬃculty of ciphertext-only attack is
H(KP | C), where K is the key of encryption algorithm
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The improved encryption algorithm
Begin:
(1) Use the traditional block cipher algorithm F to encrypt the first n-packets
Do until the end:
(2) Use algorithm F to encrypt the first packet in buﬀer.
(3) For the next l packets, let its ciphertext CPacket j = Packetj−1⊕ Packet j .
(4) Repeat steps (3) to (4).
End Do



















































Figure 8: Rear padding in packet-based SAME.









Since SAME uses the previous segment as the stream cipher
key of the current segment, the security of the current
segment depends on the previous one, finally security of
Segi+1 . . . Segi+l depends directly or indirectly on Segi, whose
security depends on the theoretical secrecy of algorithm F.
Thus, the ciphertext-only attack of SAME has an attack
diﬃculty of





Only when adjacent segments are related with each other,
that is,





However, statistical analysis of compressed video stream
shows that the data have high randomness at the byte level,
moreover the permutation before data dividing can also
reduce the relativity. Thus, the security is often not smaller
than the first segment’s encryption.








Because only Segi and Cphri relate to Key, we can obtain that
the known plaintext attack of SAME has an attack diﬃculty
of





Table 1: Throughputs of SAME with diﬀerent CPU loads (mea-
sured in MBps).
Algorithms Load 1 Load 2 Load 3 Load 4
Algorithm in PCI 989.1 977.2 974.8 847.1
Software DES 2607 2532 2519 2021
That is, the security depends only on the first segment’s
encryption.
5.2. Throughput Analyses on SAME. Owing to the limited
scale of our Admire system, we study the throughput of
SAME in simulation programs. As is shown in Figures
9(a) and 9(b), two tests, that is, Test A and Test B, are
designed to evaluate the throughputs of SAME with DES
similar algorithm in PCI card and DES implementation
in software, respectively. These two simulation programs
are implemented in C++, and each of them occupies only
one processor each time. Test A runs in a Windows XP
system with Intel Core Duo T2300 1.66GHz and 512M
RAM, and Test B runs in a Windows NT workstation with
dual-processor Intel PIV 2.4G and 512M RAM. When the
parameter l + 1 is {1, 4, 16, 64, 256, 1024, 4096}, the
throughputs of SAME in Test A and Test B are {1.45, 2.774,
5.796, 23.12, 90.03, 334.1, 989.1, 1973} and {21.91, 41.4,
86.12, 314.9, 959.5, 1935, 2607, 2843}, respectively.
The results of SAME are compared with the original full-
encryption algorithm and VEA. When l = 0, the SAME
algorithm is equal to full encryption, and when l = 1, the
SAME is equal to VEA. Experimental results also show that
when l is small, the speed nearly increases linearly. When l
is very large (e.g., l > 1000), limited by the speed of stream
cipher algorithm, the throughputs are both less than 3GBps
for the two cases.
Table 1 shows the throughputs in Tests A and B when
l + 1 = 1024 and the computers have diﬀerent loads. In
column 1, only the SAME process is busy, so there is one
CPU busy and the other is always idle. In column 2, beside
the SAME process, there is another process with heavy load
running on the other CPU, thus the two CPUs both have
heavy loads. Column 3 gives the results when a process with
on average 35MBps hard disk transmission is added. The last
column shows the results when the SAME process contests










Parameter l + 1
DES similar algorithm in PCI card
VEA use algorithm in PCI

















































DES implementation in software
VEA use DES implementation in software
SAME use DES implementation in software
(b)
Figure 9: The throughput of SAME.
CPU time with other two CPU intensive process. Comparing
column 2 with column 1, we can find that, if only one
CPU intensive process contest CPU time with SAME, the
throughput of SAME reduces less than 3%. That is because
both two process could use one CPU every time, the impact
is not notable. But when the number of CPU intensive
processes is bigger than the number of CPUs, the other
processes would observably impact the throughput of SAME,
as is shown in column 4. On the other hand, as in column
3, the I/O intensive process would not impact the SAME
a lot.
In Admire RPServer, only the SAME encryption process
is CPU intensive, other process like RTP parsing and
file saving are either I/O intensive or not CPU intensive.
Therefore, the SAME is eﬀective enough for the high-volume
real-time data in AdmireRPS.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, a security scheme for RPS system is designed
and implemented, which is based on the speed-adaptive
media-data encryption (SAME) algorithm. Firstly, com-
bining the block cipher and stream cipher algorithm, the
basic SAME algorithm is proposed. Secondly, a packet-
based SAME is proposed according to the implementation of
data storage in AdmireRPS system. Thirdly, a queue theory
based autoadaptive speed control mechanism for SAME is
designed. Finally, the packet-based SAME algorithm and the
speed control mechanism are integrated into AdmireRPS
system. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show
the security and speed of SAME are suitable for real-time
applications. Furthermore, the proposed schemes can also
be used in video surveillance and other video recording
systems.
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